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Introduction
The vast majority of economic decisions involve certain levels of uncertainty about the outcome. Economic research on risk attitudes has traditionally focused on individual decision making issues, without any consideration for potential social inuences on risk preferences (see e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011; Eckel and Grossman, 2008b; Harbaugh et al., 2010; Holt and Laury, 2002) . As real world decisions are embedded in a social context, however, a decision makers is hardly ever the only person aected by the consequences of his actions. Indeed, many risky decisions do not only aect but are specically taken on behalf of a third party. This third party might be the decision maker's family or a business partner; on a larger scale CEO's decisions aect a company or even an industry, and political decisions aect large parts of the population, a nation or beyond. On nancial markets, investors usually put an agent in charge of his risky investments. During the nancial crisis of [2007] [2008] this practice in the nancial sector became the subject of a continuing public as well as a scientic debate as it was perceived to lead to excessive risk taking (Allen and Gorton, 1993; Allen and Gale, 2000; Cheung and Coleman, 2014; Kleinlercher et al., 2014; Robin et al., 2011) . Though responsibility in risky decisions has only recently been picked up in the experimental literature (see Trautmann and Vieider (2012) for a review and section 2). The results, however, provide no consistent answer concerning the question of whether decisions on behalf of others involve higher (risky shift) or lower (cautious shift) levels of risk as compared to decision for oneself.
The terms risky shift and cautious shift were introduced by Stoner (1961) to describe situations where the initial, individual level of risk preference is altered due to exogenous impacts. In the case of responsibility the resulting shift could be in both directions. In the psychological literature, a prominent explanation for a risky shift is the psychological self-other distance (e.g., Beisswanger et al., 2003; Cvetkovich, 1972; Stone and Allgaier, 2008; Trope and Liberman, 2010; Wray and Stone, 2005) in which the evaluation of a potential loss in a risky situation is decreasing in the distance to the decision maker. This nding translates directly to the results from economic experiments (e.g., Harrison, 2006; Laury, 2002, 2005) , as risk aversion is signicantly decreased in hypothetical situations without real consequences in the laboratory 1 . Further support for this nding comes from neuro-economics. Albrecht et al. (2011) nd that making inter-temporal decisions for others result in lesser activation of areas of the brain that are thought to be engaged in emotion and reward-related processes than when taking decisions for oneself.
The resulting argument would be that decisions made on behalf of a third party are equivalent to situations without any real outcome. In contrast, Charness and Jackson (2009) propose responsibility alleviation (Charness, 2000) as an explanation for a cautious shift. According to this theory, taking responsibility for a third party's welfare induces pro-social behavior which results in conservative risk taking (Charness, 2000; Charness and Jackson, 2009 ). Though pro-social behavior can also mean that the decision maker tries to match the will of the others.
Despite prominent examples of a risky shift in nancial markets due to limited liability of money managers (e.g., Allen and Gorton, 1993) , there are several empirical observations on cautious shift behavior. Physicians, for example, have been found to prefer treatments with higher mortality rates for themselves than what they recommend to their patients (Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2012; Ubel et al., 2011) . Managers try to avoid responsibility for decisions with even a minimal probability of hazardous outcomes (Swalm, 1966; Viscusi et al., 1987) .
We study the eect of responsible nancial decision making for others using a series of economic laboratory experiments. We rst discuss design features from previous studies that might have triggered certain directions of investment shifts, i.e. increased risk taking for others (risky shift) or decreased risk taking for others (cautious shift). We then implement an experimental design that controls for these potential confound eects. In contrast to the literature, we consider a design with high responsibility (six clients) in a situation with and without payo alignment of the decision maker. We discuss several behavioral theories that might explain the conicting results in the literature.
In our experiment, an individual decision maker (henceforth the money manager) faces a risky investment situation similar to Gneezy and Potters (1997) . In our three treatments the money manager either invests only for himself, only for a group of six other subjects (henceforth the clients) without any monetary relevance for himself (no payo alignment), or he invests an equal amount for the clients and for himself (payo alignment). This enables us to systematically study the eect of social responsibility on risk aversion as well as the eect of possible dierences between the money manager's and his clients' risk preferences. We found the existing literature to equalize two profoundly dierent situations, one in which the money manager's payo is perfectly aligned with the clients' payo, i.e., the money managers take the same risk, and one in which the money manager's payo is independent of his investments. Our study is the rst to systematically compare these theoretically very dierent situations and to attempt to identify a unifying behavioral explanation for the mixed results in the literature.
Our aggregate results indicate investment behavior to be in line with responsibility alleviation as the money managers invest signicantly less when clients bear the consequences even when the money manager's payo depends on his investment. However, this cautious shift is purely driven by money managers with low levels of risk aversion. For money managers with high levels of risk aversions, we nd indications for a risky shift. Apparently, when making decisions for others the money managers try to act according to the clients' risk preferences. Eliciting the money manager's beliefs about the clients' propensity to invest from themselves, we indeed nd that money managers on average invest an equal amount for their clients they believe the clients would invest for themselves. In the case of payo alignment, we nd that the dierence between his own risk preference and the perceived risk preferences of the group determines the decision. We t a weighted preference function to our data allowing us to determine the level of altruism of our subjects. On average the money managers display a signicant amount of responsibility. However, they assess their individual preferences to be more important than those of the six clients.
Literature Review
There is a small, yet growing body of literature on risky decision making for others with rather mixed results (nd an overview in table G.10 in the online supplement). A number of studies nd evidence for a risky shift, i.e. money managers take a signicantly higher risk for others than for themselves. Chakravarty et al. (2011) nd that subjects tend to be less risk averse when deciding for others, using a rst price sealed bid auction against computer bidders as well as a multiple price list. They conclude that decision makers display social preferences when deciding for others but also argue, though do not test, that decision making for others is not dierent from hypothetical risk taking. Results from a multiple price list design in Andersson et al. (forthcoming) , though insignicant, suggest rather a risky shift. Using structural estimation they argue that loss aversion is reduced when investing for others. Polman (2012) nds a risky shift when considering a multiple price list in his third study. 2 Using the Gneezy and Potters (1997) investment game with repetition, Pollmann et al. (2014) and Sutter (2009) nd a signicant risky shift. 3 In contrast, a cautious shift, i.e., money managers take signicantly lower risks for the clients than for themselves, has been found by an even larger number of studies. In Reynolds et al. (2009) the money manager decides between a safe and a risky choice for himself rst, and subsequently for each individual in a group of clients (three to ve subjects). They nd the number of safe choices to be in general higher for others than for the money manager himself. Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010) replicate the experiment from Gneezy and Potters (1997) but added a treatment in which money managers invest the endowment of one client only. Investments are signicantly lower when investing for clients than when investing for the money manager himself. As a control they reran the treatment with hypothetical clients and found investment levels to be signicantly higher. 4
Montinari and Rancan (2013) used a similar version to Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010) but with lotteries yielding a negative expected return. Still the money managers invested more for themselves than for their clients, especially if the client was a friend of the money manager. Charness and Jackson (2009) consider strategical risk taking in the stag-hunt game in which two players choose either stag (risky) or hare (risk-less). They report lower numbers of stag-plays when the payo consequences are shared with another subject, concluding that their result is in line with a responsibility alleviation eect (Charness, 2000) . In the rst setting of Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) subjects choose between a risky choice and a safe choice for oneself and others or only for others. They nd a cautious shift with the number of safe choices being lower for others than for oneself only. They suggest a tendency to take conservative risk when one's choice aects other people's welfare. Bolton et al. (2015) nd further evidence in line with this suggestion using a multiple price list design.
Using a battery of lotteries and similar decisions for oneself and a third party, Pahlke et al. (2012) provide evidence for a risky shift in the loss domain and a cautious shift in the gain domain for moderate probabilities; and a reversal for small probabilities. They conclude that their results discredits hypotheses of a 'cautious shift' under responsibility, and indicates an accentuation of the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes usually found for individual choices (p.22) . Finally
Humphrey and Renner (2011) using a multiple price list nd no signicant shift at all.
Thus, the evidence is as mixed as are the experimental designs. Although describing a (largely) similar situation, the studies mentioned dier in various aspects. With the oppositional ndings of a risky as well as a cautious shift, the obvious conclusion is that the dierences in design might be driving the diering results. Our approach is therefore to identify confounding factors and systematically exclude or control them in our experimental design. Responsibility. Apart from Sutter (2009) 9 the previous studies consider decision making for one client only. We expand the responsibility for the money manager as each has to manage a 54-Euro-fund for six clients. According to responsibility alleviation (Charness, 2000; Charness and Jackson, 2009 ) the effects of responsibility should be increasing in the number of aected parties.
Therefore, any eects observed in previous studies, should be amplied in our setting.
Accountability. Accountability, i.e., the fact that the money managers can be blamed for their decision, has been shown to be an important factor when making risky decisions for others. Pollmann et al. (2014) provide evidence for a reduction in risk taking for others under accountability. This might also hold true for implicit accountability in the sense that the clients are able to Bolton et al. (2015) , see tableG.10 in the online supplement.
7 Andersson et al. (forthcoming) conduct experiments on both OTH and LEA but do not discuss theoretical consequences nor do they compare the observed dierences between OTH and LEA.
8 Note that ex ante or ex post fairness plays no role as the money manager and the client receive the same payo.
9 A LEA setting in which the money manager has to decide for a group of three. 8 observe the money manager's decision albeit they do not know the identity of the money manager (Eriksen and Kvaløy, 2010) . In this light, accountability could have aected the results of Reynolds et al. (2009) as the decision was openly announced to the group. Obviously, this holds as well in decisions made for a friend (Humphrey and Renner, 2011; Montinari and Rancan, 2013) . To rule out accountability as a confounding eect, our clients are not able to infer the identity of a money manager nor are they able to observe the decision during the decision making process.
Repetition. Sutter (2009) Anchoring. In Reynolds et al. (2009) , the money manager rst made a decision for himself, observed the results of his investment, and then made a decision for the others. The feedback for the rst decision, however, alters the information set for the subsequent decision. This situation could trigger psychological anchoring eects such as gamblers fallacy or hot hand belief (see e.g., Huber et al., 2010) . In Sutter (2009) , each decision taken was observed by the whole group, so even if the decision maker took his rst turn, his decisions were inuenced by the observations of previous outcomes. This procedure might explain the observation of decreasing risk aversion over the nine subsequent decisions. In our design, the participants receive information on the outcome of their investment only at the end of the experiment, thereby keeping the information set in all decisions constant.
Order eects. Most of the studies consider a between-subjects design. But
Montinari and Rancan (2013) consider a within-subject design replicating Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010), though with a negative expected period return. The sequence of action was as follows. Money managers rst invested twelve times for themselves (OWN), followed by twelve investments for others (OTH), and twelve investments for friends (OTH). Thus, learning over 36 repetitions alone might lead to a reduction in risk taking. However, Montinari and Rancan (2013) conclude to observe a cautious shift comparing the treatments. Unfortunately, they cannot rule out experience as a confound eect as they did not control for order eects. We consider a within-subject design as well, but control for order eects by implementing an AB/BA design.
Self-other distance. A further argument for dierent results might be explained by self-other distance. Among others, Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010) show that investments for hypothetical clients lead to signicantly higher risk taking than for real clients in the laboratory. However, Andersson et al. (forthcoming) nd no signicant dierences when comparing a hypothetical risky decision and a risky decision with an eect for others in an internet experiment with higher social distance. These results indicate that laboratory experiments seem to increase the perception of making decisions for real clients (closer social distance) not for a potentially hypothetical ones in the internet (higher social distance).
Fairness. Finally, one might argue that fairness preferences play a role when payments for the money managers are xed or known beforehand in OTH as for example in Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010), Reynolds et al. (2009 ) or Chakravarty et al. (2011 . A money manager receiving a small xed payo might make smaller investments for his clients if he perceives that high investments might create payo inequalities to his disadvantage. Reversely, a high xed payo might induce a money manager to make high investments for his clients. To control for this issue, we varied the xed payo for the money manager when investing for his clients (OTH). In one setting, the money manager earns the lowest and in a second setting the highest possible payo the clients could achieve.
To sum up, we design a situation in which a money manager makes a risky investment for six clients. His payo is either perfectly aligned with the clients' payos (LEA) or not aligned at all (OTH). We do not consider incentive compatible contracting in a principal-agent relationship, but focus on the pure eect of responsibility for a third party. We control for fairness issues, concerning the allocation of resources (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002, 2005) , and ex ante and ex post fairness considerations (see Fudenberg and Levine, 2012) , exclude accountability, and test for order eects. Finally, we do not consider competition among money managers as in Agranov et al. (2014) but focus purely on changes in risk taking when making investment decisions for others.
10
3 Design and Procedure
Treatments
We consider the Gneezy and Potters (1997) investment setting as the relative simplicity of the method, combined with the fact that it can be implemented with one trial and basic experimental tools, makes it a useful instrument for assessing risk preferences (Charness et al., 2013, p. 45) . 10 In our baseline treatment (OWN), each subject is endowed with 9 Euro and is asked to decide on the amount to invest in a risky asset. With a probability of 2/3 the amount invested is lost and with a probability of 1/3 the investment earns a return of 250 percent. For X ∈ {0, 9} being the amount invested, the payo was either π OWN = 9 − X, in case of a loss, or π OWN = 9 + 2.5 X, in case of a win. In treatment OTH, subjects are organized in groups of seven, consisting of six passive members, the clients (c), and one active member, the money manager (m). Each client, is endowed with 9 Euro and the money manager decides on the amount to invest in the risky asset for each of the six clients. The amount invested is identical for all clients. The payo for each client is either π OTH c = 9 − X, in case of a loss, or π OTH c = 9 + 2.5 X, in case of a win. The payo for the money manager in any case is π OTH m = 0, which is common knowledge. To control for possible eects due to fairness preferences (see section 2) we also implement a treatment in which the money managers payo was π OT H c = 31.5, which is, again, common knowledge. In treatment LEA, we implement the same group protocol as in OTH. In contrast to OTH, all subjects including the money manager, are endowed with 9 Euro. The money manager decides on the amount to invest for each of the six clients and for himself. The amount invested is identical for all group members. The payo is either π LEA 
Implementation
The experiment was conducted at the Ruhr-University Bochum experimental laboratory (RUBεχ). The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . We administered a within-subject design as subjects made their decision in each of the three treatments. Upon arrival subjects were randomly placed at computer terminals separated by blinds.
In each treatment, instructions were read aloud and questions were answered privately. The experiment only started once we were sure all participants had comprehended the instructions. Once the treatments started, subjects were endowed with an on-screen calculator where they could enter arbitrary investment levels. The calculator would display a list containing all entered investment levels, the respective own payo and (in case of OTH and LEA) the clients payo in case of a loss and in case of a win.
11 Subjects subsequently chose one investment level from the generated list and conrmed their choice. To exclude repetition eects, participants were only informed that the experiment would consist of three independent parts, without specifying the exact nature of each part upfront. The instructions for each part were distributed only after the previous part was concluded. Subjects did not receive any feedback on their decisions until the end of the experiment.
12 After the last treatment, subjects had to answer a short debrieng questionnaire.
In the OTH and LEA treatments, each subject rst made an anonymous investment decision in the role of a money manager for each of the six clients in the group (OTH) or for the whole group including himself (LEA). But at the end of the experiment, the investment decision of only one randomly drawn money manager in a group was binding for all group members. This procedure was common information. To avoid accountability eects, we guaranteed anonymity.
Neither the money managers knew the identity of the clients nor did the clients know the identity of the money manager. We informed the subjects that only one of three treatments is payo relevant. At the end of a session, we threw a dice to determine the payo relevant treatment and we threw a dice for each group to determine whether the investment was successful or not. Subjects were payed privately and in cash and left the lab.
We ran 15 sessions with a total of 175 participants. Our participants were mostly bachelor students from all departments of the Ruhr-University Bochum.
Subject participated only once in this experiment. We implemented three dierent setups. In setup one (70 observations), the treatment order was OTH-OWN-LEA. In setup two (70 observations), the treatment order was LEA-OWN-OTH.
In setup three (35 observations), we reran setup one but the money manager earned the highest possible amount, i.e., π OTH m = 9+2.5×9 = 31.50 Euro (which was also common knowledge). Comparing setup one to setup two we nd no order eect and comparing setup one to setup three we nd no eect on the payment condition.
13 Thus, we pool the data and end up with 175 independent observations. For those who are interested in gender eects, we provide a short 11 A short description on how subjects decided including a screenshot can be found in the online supplement section E.
12 Find instructions in the online supplement in section F. 13 We provide test results in the online supplement section A. (Ross et al., 1977) , invest the same amount for himself and for the clients, i.e., X OWN = X OTH . In contrast, the self-others discrepancy eect states that money managers evaluate their own risk preferences dierently than the risk preferences of their clients (Hsee and Weber, 1997; Eckel and Grossman, 2008a; Leuermann and Roth, 2012) . Thus, the predicted shift depends on the risk attitudes of the money managers relative to their clients. If money managers believe the clients to be relatively risk averse, they would invest less for the clients then for themselves (X OWN > X OTH ), while money managers who believe the clients to be relatively risk seeking, would invest more for the clients then for themselves (X OWN < X OTH ). This could be one possible explanation for the mixed results in the literature. Studies nding a risky shift might simply feature a rather risk averse sample of the population, as studies reporting a cautious shift might by chance have a sample of rather risk loving money managers. To our knowledge, this has not been examined in the previous literature so far.
In contrast to OTH, rational models make clear predictions on risk taking in LEA. Excluding other-regarding preferences, decisions in OWN and LEA should not dier, i.e., X OWN = X LEA . However, when the money manager's payo is perfectly aligned with the clients' payos, egoistic preferences will be opposed by any social preference theory following the same predictions as for OTH.
Thus, when the social preferences for clients completely crowd out the egoistic 13 preferences of the money manager there is no dierence to the situation without payo alignment, i.e., X LEA = X OTH . When both preferences play a role, we hypothesize the investments in LEA to be in-between investments in OWN and OTH, i.e., either X OWN ≥ X LEA ≥ X OTH or X OWN ≤ X LEA ≤ X OTH . Note that the interaction of social and/or egoistic preferences in risky decision making can only be studied when all three treatments are considered in a within-subjects design. Notes. The second column contains all observations, high risk reports observations for subjects investing above the median (4) in OWN, low risk reports observations for subjects investing below or at the median in OWN. The last three rows contain the shift between investments in OTH and OWN (S OTH = X OTH − X OWN ) and between LEA and OWN (S LEA = X LEA − X OWN ). Standard deviations reported in parentheses. The asterisks refer to the p-value from a Wilcoxon signed rank test testing the H0 that S equals zero. * = p <0.1, ** = p <0.05, *** = p <0.001.
Since the average investments in OWN (4.55 Euro) exceed average investments in OTH (3.90 Euro), we can conrm a signicant cautious shift which is on average at S OTH = −0.65 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.001). 14 Turning 14 None of the relevant variables is normally distributed according to the Shapiro-Wilk Test for normality (all p-values are below 0.001). Thus, we make use of non-parametric tests to a situation in which egoistic preferences may play a role, we again conrm a signicant cautious shift which is on average at S LEA = −0.57 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.001) as in LEA the average investment drops to 3.98
Euro. Thus, we state observation 1. Observation 1. Money managers invest signicantly less for their clients than for themselves; independent of whether their payments are aligned with the clients payment.
This result is a clear indication of acting in line with the social responsibility hypothesis. We nd a signicant cautious shift, not only in OTH but also in LEA, which is in contrast to the prediction of the standard rationality models.
The self-other discrepancy can be seen as a renement of social responsibility as the money manager tries to act responsible by investing according to the investors risk preferences while deviating from his personal preferences. The direction and magnitude of the observed shift would depend on the perceived deviation of the money managers risk preferences from the average. To study this hypothesis, we split the whole sample of 175 observations in two groups: the high risk sample (h ), i.e., subjects who chose X OWN above the median investment of 4.00 Euro, and the low risk sample (l ), i.e., subjects who chose X OWN below or at the median investment. The second and third columns in we conclude that the pattern suggested by the self-other discrepancy prevails in our observations. Thus, we state observation 2.
Observation 2. In line with the self-other-distance theory, money managers with low risk aversion show a signicant cautious shift, while money managers with a high risk aversion show an insignicant risky shift.
In both samples the money managers seem to assume that their own risk preferences deviate from the average of the population. Thus, the decisions for their clients reect a propensity towards the perceived average preference of although we consider 175 independent observations. We ran further regression which can be found in the online supplement.
15 Excluding the median investors we nd a weakly signicant dierence in OTH (S OTH l = 0.37, p = 0.082, n = 70). their clients. As the resulting risky shift of the low risk investors is smaller and insignicant, the cautious shift of the high risk investors is driving the aggregate results.
These conclusions are only derived from observed behavior under the assumption that money managers did indeed presume the average risk aversion to be higher or lower than their personal risk preferences. To test whether this assumption was correct or a mere artifact, we elicited the participants beliefs on the other participants investment levels in treatment OWN ( EX OWN j ) in the debrieng questionnaire. 16 Table 2 depicts respective measures. The average dierence between beliefs and own investment (EX OWN j − X OWN ) is not signicantly dierent from zero (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.654). This indicates that money managers on average do not believe others to take less or more risk then they take for themselves. These are only averages, however, displaying that the money managers have a clear perception of the sample populations risk preferences. Notes. Cells show averages for a sub-sample of 112 participants from which we elicited beliefs.
EX OWN j denotes the beliefs about the investments of others in OWN. High risk reports observations for subjects investing above the median (4) in OWN, low risk reports observations for subjects investing below median in OWN. Standard deviations reported in parentheses. The asterisks refer to the p-value from a Wilcoxon signed rank test testing the H0 that S equals zero. * = p <0.1, ** = p <0.05, *** = p <0.001.
On the individual level the investment in OTH can still deviate signicantly from the expectation of the average risk preference. Thus, we again split the sample in the high risk and the low risk group along the median investment in OWN. And indeed, we nd that money managers in the high risk sample believe others to invest signicantly less than themselves (EX OWN j − X OWN = −1.68, p < 0.001) while money managers in the low risk group believe others to invest signicantly more (EX OWN j − X OWN = 1.04, p < 0.001).
But to establish that money managers perceive their personal risk preferences dierently than the population average is only the rst step in testing the self-other discrepancy as a driving factor behind social responsibility. The next 16 As we started to work on this question only after the rst 63 observations had been collected, we can only use a sub-sample of 112 observations for this analysis. All results reported in this study remain unchanged whether we use the subsample or the full sample. Observation 4. The investment shifts in LEA and OTH are not signicantly dierent at the 5 percent signicance level.
This is a surprising result. The aggregate observations suggest not only that money managers feature social preferences but also that their individual risk preferences are overridden, once they decide for themselves and a group of clients. To examine the origins of this, rather counter intuitive, aggregate pattern, we look at individual behavior in the following section.
Responsibility weights
Apparently, in LEA the money managers deviate substantially from their own risk preferences and act rather in line with the risk preferences of the clients. This raises the question of how much weight is put on each of these opposing preferences when making an investment in LEA. Our experimental design allows us to model the relationship between individual risk preferences and the perceived risk preferences of the clients by considering the link-treatment LEA; the combination of OWN and OTH. If the money managers only care about themselves, we would predict X OWN = X LEA independent of X OTH . Thus, the decision reects the risk attitude of the decision maker only. If the money managers only care for the clients, we would predict X LEA = X OTH independent of X OWN . And indeed the previous section indicates that on average X OWN > X LEA = X OTH . Hence, the average money managers take responsibility for the clients and put their own needs in LEA on hold, as they are willing to reduce the investment levels for themselves in LEA in comparison to OWN. Whether a money managers cares more for himself or rather for the clients can be inferred by estimating a responsibility weight α given by the relationship in (1).
The interpretation is straight forward given S OT H = 0. For α = 0, the money manager cares only for himself which implies that X LEA = X OW N . For α = 1, the money manager cares only for his clients and puts his own preferences to hold implying X LEA = X OT H . For 0 < α < 1, the money managers weights egoistic preferences and social preferences. Suppose a money manager opts for a cautious shift such that α = 0.70. This indicates that the money manager takes the clients' risk preferences with a weight of 70 percent into account, and his own risk preferences with a weight of 30 percent. We can calculate a valid α if X LEA is in-between X OWN and X OTH which is the case for 94 subjects. 17 Table 3 provides aggregates on the responsibility weight α for all 94 subjects, and separated by types, i.e., the cautious shift types (S OTH < 0) and the risky shift types (S OTH > 0). In our sample the mean responsibility weight is 0.36 which again conrms the social preference motive of investments. However, this weight is signicantly lower than 0.5 indicating that the preference of the money manager plays a larger role in his decisions than the preferences of the investors.
Observation 5. Money managers take their client's risk preferences into account when making decisions for both clients and themselves. However, their decisions depend more strongly on their own preferences.
The average α for money managers who display a cautious shift equals 0.43 which is not signicantly dierent from 0.5 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.150). Money managers displaying a risky shift display have an average α of 0.25 which is signicantly lower than 0.5 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p < 0.001). Hence, risky shift types show a signicantly lowerα than the cautious shift types (two-sided Mann Whitney U test, p = 0.039). This indicates that the risky shift types take their own preferences stronger into account than the cautious shift types.
An explanation for these dierent patterns could be found in loss aversion. Cautious shift types are willing to reduce risk taking in LEA, i.e., to sacrice potential earnings for oneself in order to reduce potential losses for the clients. In contrast, risky shift types need to increase risk taking in LEA to reach a similar α. Consequently, they have to accept potentially higher losses to satisfy the pretended needs of the clients.
Discussion and Conclusion
We study the eects of responsibility in risky decision making, using a oneshot Gneezy and Potters (1997) investment game while controlling for confounding eects detected in the literature. First, in line with responsibility alleviation, we nd a signicant cautious shift in risky decisions for others, irrespective of whether the decision makers payos are perfectly aligned with the clients or independent. Second, in line with the self-other-distance theory, we nd that money managers invest in line with what they believe others would like to invest for themselves (in line with Bolton et al., 2015) . In particular, money makers exhibiting low risk aversion make rather conservative investments for others, resulting in a cautious shift, while highly risk averse money managers take higher risks for their clients, resulting in a risky shift. Third, using a responsibility weighting model we nd that cautious shift types take own preferences and the preferences of the clients about equally into account when making investment decisions in LEA. However, risky shift types overweight their own preferences as a higher weight for the clients would increase their own risk taking and potential losses.
But how can we explain the mixed results in the literature? In the following, we provide some suggestions in line with our results.
Loss aversion for more than one other. Previous studies have reported a risky shift and argue that reduced loss aversion due to a higher social distance explains the risky shift (e.g., Andersson et al., forthcoming) . Thus, a reason for the dierence in results might be that the argument holds if deciding for one client only. But it might be that aggregated loss aversion for six clients is greater than loss aversion for oneself leading to a cautious shift. 18 Hence, we ran further experiments in which the money manager invests for one client only as a robustness check (see section C in the online supplement). The results provide no indication for a risky shift either. We rather nd that the results are qualitatively equal to the results in the experiments with six clients. We conclude that the level of responsibility does not alter our ndings.
Ambiguity Aversion. While money managers might know their own preferences, they are uncertain about the clients' preferences; in particular when estimating the preferences of six clients. This creates an ambiguous situation when deciding for others in contrast to when deciding for oneself. From that point of view, our results are in line with ambiguity aversion as subjects take less risk in a situation with higher ambiguity (e.g., Trautmann and Van De Kuilen, forthcoming) . This is even amplied as in the within-subject design subjects are able to compare decisions for others and for themselves in line with comparative ignorance (Fox and Tversky, 1995) .
Risk attitude of the population. The conclusions so far are based on aggregate results only, as is the case in the previous literature. Due to our within-subject design we are able to take the relative risk attitudes of the money manager into account. We nd that the results are driven by the relatively risk seeking subjects, while for the relatively risk averse subjects we nd rather a risky shift.
Given our sample, the aggregate result of a cautious shift is driven by the group of high risk money managers. But any study with a rather risk averse subject pool would nd an aggregate risky shift, of course. Hence, dierences to for instance Andersson et al. (forthcoming) might be due to the fact that their subject pool is taken from the general Danish population which has been found to be more risk averse than the common student population (von Gaudecker et al., 2012) . 19 Social Distance. Among others, Eriksen and Kvaløy (2010) report that hypothetical decision making for others -the most extreme social distance -leads to higher risk taking in comparison to a situation with monetary consequences.
Thus, experiments with higher social distance, as is the case for internet experiments in as compared to laboratory experiments, might lead to higher risk taking for others.On the other hand our experimental design allows the potential money managers to put themselves into the position of the clients as with high probability the money manager becomes a client. This might lead to a higher empathy for the others leading to a rather cautious shift (as in the equal opportunity mode treatment in Bolton and Ockenfels, 2006) . Domains. The results from the literature suggest that the domain of the lotteries plays a relevant role. Lotteries in the loss domain or in the mixed domain seem to support a risky shift while lotteries in the gain domain support a cautious shift Pahlke et al. (e.g., 2012 ). In the Gneezy and Potters (1997) investment game, however, we cannot control the subject's perception of the game as we have no record of the editing phase (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) .
When the endowment is integrated, the decision takes place in the gain domain only (9 + 2.5X vs. 9 − X). When the endowment is segregated, the decision takes place in the mixed domain (2.5X vs. −X). Our results point to the former as we provide integrated outcomes on the decision screen which fosters a cautious shift (see section E in the online supplement).
What drives investments when payments are perfectly aligned (LEA): Egoistic preferences or social preferences? Unfortunately, the literature so far has not considered the link between LEA and OWN on the one hand, and LEA and OTH on the other hand. These links, however, are quite important to answer the question, as it combines decision making for oneself only and decision making for others only in one decision. On average, we observe a cautious shift in LEA and OTH which is smaller in LEA than in OTH. Hence, in LEA the social preferences play a role but the money managers cannot be expected to fully disregard their own preferences. While this consideration is straight forward, we are (to the best of our knowledge) the rst to directly compare these two situations. Using the decisions in OTH and in OWN as reference points, we are able to construct a weighed risk preference model allowing us to determine the individual responsibility weight of our participants. On average the money managers take not only their own risk preferences (egoistic preferences) into account but also the risk preferences of the clients (social risk preferences). Though they seem to weight their egoistic preferences stronger than the social preferences. Casually speaking, in our experiments decisions in LEA depend on average by about 36 percent on social preferences and by 64 percent on egoistic preferences. This eect is even stronger for the risky-shift managers. They have to accept higher losses for the good of the others while the cautious-shift managers have to only sacrice potential earnings.
Online Supplement

A Pool Data
To test whether an order eect has an impact on investment levels, we compare 70 observations in which subjects made investment decisions in the order OTH-LEA-OWN and 70 observations in the order LEA-OWN-OTH. First, we make use of a Mann-Whitney U test to evaluate the H 0 that investment levels do not dier between orders. In neither treatment we can reject the H 0 (OWN p = 0.474, LEA p = 0.770, OTH p = 0.375). Second, we test the H 0 that dierences in investment levels between treatments do not dier between orders. Again, we cannot reject the H 0 for either comparison (X OWN −X OTH , p = 0.858, X OWN − X LEA p = 0.348, X OTH − X LEA , p = 0.154, ). To test whether the payment condition for the money manager in OTH has an impact on investment levels we compare 70 observations with a zero payment for the decision maker and 35 observations with a payment of 31.50 Euro for the decision maker (both in the order OTH-LEA-OWN). . In neither treatment we can reject the H 0 that investment levels do not dier between payment conditions (OWN p = 0.981, LEA p = 0.561, OTH p = 0.924). We also cannot reject the H 0 that dierences in investment levels between treatments do not dier between payment condition for either comparison (X OWN − X OTH , p = 521, X OWN − X LEA p = 0.179, X OTH − X LEA , p = 0.488). Hence, we pool the data, obtaining in total 175 observations. Find also the regressions below to conrm this decision. Why is there no signicant gender eect? It is argued that the gender eect is rather due to loss aversion than due to risk aversion. Especially, in the Gneezy and Potters (1997) environment the reference point is unclear; it might be the endowment or zero. In our z-Tree screen design the reference point might be shifted toward zero. Subjects rst generated a list of payos by entering investment levels and then chose one of these investment levels. In this screen we provide information on the payo when successful and on the payo when not successful; both above or at zero. Thus, we virtually reduce loss aversion as we provide information in the gain domain only and, thus, set the reference point to zero.
In a debrieng questionnaire, we ask several questions on risk aversion in line with Dohmen et al. (2011) . Using a Mann-Whitney U test, we nd signicant gender dierences in questions about risk taking in general (p = 0.004), while driving a car (p = 0.019), when making nancial decisions (p = 0.002), and to some extent in sports and leisure (p = 0.074). We nd no eect in questions on risk taking in career (p = 0.319), health (p = 0.937), trust in strangers(p = 0.567), or in a hypothetical investment decision (p = 0.132).
C Robustness check with one client only
It has been argued that a decision for others decreases loss aversion resulting in a risky shift in OTH (Andersson et al., forthcoming) . However, none of the relevant studies considers more than one client. In our study we increase the responsibility to six clients and thereby increase the total potential loss from 9 Euro in OWN to 54 Euro in OTH. The higher responsibility might increase the loss aversion due to a multiplicative eect and results in an overall cautious shift.
To test whether the magnitude of responsibility plays a role, we ran a follow up experiment under the same conditions but with a group size of two, i.e., one money manager decides for one client in LEA and OTH. As hypothesized we expect a risky shift, i.e., we test the H 0 that S LEA ≤ 0 and that S OTH ≤ 0 using a one-sided Wilcoxon signed rank test. In a OTH-OWN-LEA sequence with 34 observations, we cannot reject H 0 and, thus, nd no evidence for a risky shift (S LEA = −0.44, p = 0.319,S OTH = −0.03, p = 0.284). In line with the analysis in the paper, we split the sample in low risk sample (n = 21) and high risk sample (n = 13) at X OW N = 4 and ran a two sided Wilcoxon signed rank test. As for the six clients treatments, we nd an indication for a risky shift in the low risk sample (S LEA Notes. The second column contains all observations, high risk reports observations for subjects investing above the median (4) in OWN, low risk reports observations for subjects investing below or at the median in OWN. The last three rows contain the shift between investments in OTH and OWN (S OTH = X OTH − X OWN ) and between LEA and OWN (S LEA = X LEA − X OWN ). Standard deviations reported in parenthesis. The asterisks refer to the p-value from a Wilcoxon signed rank test testing the H0 that dierences equal zero. * = p <0.1, ** = p <0.05, *** = p <0.001.
D Regressions
In the OLS regressions in table D.8 and in table D.9, we regress the shift in investments, S OTH and S LEA respectively, on treatment conditions (Dummy variables Order, High payment in OTH, and One client), subjects characteristics (Female, Age, and Econ student), and elicited measures (Being in a high risk sample: High risk, and SR-score, the social responsibility score, taken from Berkowitz and Lutterman (1968) ). Model (1) shows that even if we control for 30 treatment conditions we nd the constant to be signicantly negative, which is in line with non-parametric considerations in section C and section A. In model
(2) and model (3) we see, however, that the relatively risk seeking subjects drive the cautious shift as the High risk coecient is negative and highly signicant.
In line with section B we nd no gender eect. Finally, we elicited the SR-score to show that social responsible subjects act rather in line with responsibility alleviation. However, we nd no correlation with the dependent variables and we also nd no indication that subjects who score high on the SR-score act more
in line with what they think the clients would do for themselves. Notes: The table shows OLS regressions. The independent dummy variables are Order, being 1 when LEA is played rst, High Payment, being 1 when the money manager receives a payment of 31.50 Euro instead of a zero payment, One client, being 1 when the money manager invested for only one client, High risk, being 1 when investments in OWN are higher than the median investment in OWN (= 4.00 Euro), Female, being 1 if the participant was a woman, and Econ student, being 1 if the student was an economics student. Further variables are Age, General risk (a higher score indicates a higher propensity to take risks), and SRscore (Social Responsibility Score), taken from Berkowitz and Lutterman (1968) (a higher score indicates higher social responsibility). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Notes: The table shows OLS regressions. The independent dummy variables are Order, being 1 when LEA is played rst, High Payment, being 1 when the money manager receives a payment of 31.50 Euro instead of a zero payment, One client, being 1 when the money manager invested for only one client, High risk, being 1 when investments in OWN are higher than the median investment in OWN (= 4.00 Euro), Female, being 1 if the participant was a woman, and Econ student, being 1 if the student was an economics student. Further variables are Age, and SR-score (Social Responsibility Score), taken from Berkowitz and Lutterman (1968) (a higher score indicates higher social responsibility). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
E Decision Screen
Figure 1 provides a screenshot of an investment decision in OWN. Subjects were able to enter arbitrary investment levels in the gray eld (INPUT in Euro). A click on the gray button (GENERATE PAYOFFS) added a new line to a table. The table listed the investment in the rst column, the payo in case of a loss along with the probability in the second column, and the Neither the other participants nor the experimenter will nd out which choices you have made and how much you have earned during the experiment.
SUB EXPERIMENTS
You will participate in three independent sub experiments followed by a short questionnaire. For each sub experiment you receive a new set of instructions.
Of the three sub experiments only one will be paid out at the end of the experiment. The payo relevant experiment will be randomly determined by the roll of a die. EXPERIMENT 1
Groups -At the begin of the experiments you will be randomly organized in groups of seven participants. Your group aliation has no impact on your tasks or your payment.
Role -In this part participants are either active or passive members. In each group there is only one active member. This member decides for all other six members and, thereby, determines their payo. The active group member will randomly be determined at the end of the experiment. First, all participants decide as the active member for all other group members. At the end of the experiment the real active member will be determined and his decision will be implemented.
Task -In the following your decision as an active member will be explained.
The passive members receive 9 Euro each. You now decide for each of the other members how much of their 9 Euro to invest in a risky project. The investment is the same for each passive group member, i.e., when you invest a certain amount then you invest this amount for each passive group member.
The remaining amount (9 Euro -Investment) will be paid out to each passive member independent of the project's success. The project is either a success or a failure. In case of a success each passive member gets her invested amount back and in addition receives 2.5 times of the investment as a gain:
